By Desta Heliso
February 4, 2023
(ANALYSIS) The schism in the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC), one of the most ancient and largest churches in the world, is another symptomatic evidence of the twin threats that Ethiopia is currently facing, namely ethnocentrism that results from fusing ethnicity with politics, and religious extremism that results from fusing ethnicity with religion.
The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Dr Abiy Ahmed, recently referred to these threats as commodities of division that are manufactured in the ‘political marketplace of ethnocentrism and religious bigotry’ and enabled by social media and promoters of localised narratives. This, he warned, could undermine Ethiopianness and potentially lead to chaos and humiliation (1). In this article, I will discuss the nature and magnitude of the current crisis within EOTC, its cause and context and the possible ways in which the crisis can be de-escalated and solutions can be found.
The Crisis and Its Possible Causes
On 26th January 2023, the Holy Synod of EOTC, in its extraordinary meeting convened in Addis Ababa, excommunicated three archbishops and 25 ‘bishops’ (out of 26). The three archbishops were accused of illegally ordaining (one of the appointees repented before the Synod passed the decision) and, in so doing, breaking the ecclesiastical dogma of the church and the laws of Fetha Negest (‘Justice of the Kings’), a legal code first compiled by the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt and then adopted, adapted and expanded by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in the 15th century AD. The rebellious bishops then declared their intention to establish a rival synod and retaliated by excommunicating several archbishops including the General Manager of the Patriarchate, His Grace Abune Abraham, and the General Secretary of the Synod, His Grace Abune Petros. They are placing the blame on the Holy Synod of EOTC for the current division.
For those who don’t know Ethiopia well, it is difficult to imagine the magnitude of the dangers the current development is posing not only to one of the most ancient churches of arguably almost 1,700 years but also for the peace and stability of the whole nation and the region. Once the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, referred to EOTC as a state. This is metaphorical, of course, but it is an accurate description in terms of the church’s size. With an estimated membership of between 40 and 50 million people, EOTC is comparable to the population of the state of Kenya or Uganda. According to the existing Ethiopian Civil Code, EOTC is ‘regarded by law as a person and, as such, it can have and exercise, through its organs, all the rights which are vested in it by the administrative laws’ (398/1). Although the current constitution of the country states that there is no state religion in Ethiopia, EOTC remains de jure state church. Given its historical position and numerical immensity, no peace and unity within EOTC means no peace and unity within Ethiopia.
What is behind the current schism? What are the demands of the three archbishops and those illegally appointed by them? I understand that the demands of the leaders of the schism are not faith-related or doctrinal. Their demands centre on administrative, ethnic and linguistic matters. For example, the fact that liturgies and teachings are not conducted in the vernacular is causing loss of membership. Huge corruption and administrative problems within the church are not properly addressed. The hierarchy of the church, dominated by people from a certain geographical location, failed to listen to their concerns. All this sounds reasonable. The church may indeed have some very serious problems. The hierarchy of the church may indeed have failed to listen to the concerns of the clergy and act upon them.
But, in my view, the claims behind the current schismatic action by the three archbishops and their group are simply a smokescreen aimed to achieve a political goal characterised by an ethnocentric and exclusivist agenda. It was started two years ago when a group attempted to establish a separate patriarchate for the Oromo region. The difference this time is that the effort is much more concerted and an attempt is made to make the schismatic group more inclusive. This also looks disingenuous, because the whole process is driven by a politics of identity where the leaders of the schism want to establish a patriarchate that mirrors the current ethnic based political and administrative arrangements. Some factional political groups and geopolitical forces are suspected of being behind this chaos as well.
Political Context
The schism in EOTC reflects the ethnocentric political ideology that has prevailed in Ethiopia for the last 30 or so years. The survival of this ideology has been dependent mainly on an extreme form of a Machiavellian divide and rule approach. More pertinently, the architects of the ideology used a two-pronged approach to undermine EOTC and achieve their political goals. First, they created a condition where ethnic and religious identities are coalesced with socio-political ideals. Second, they ruthlessly and effectively instrumentalised the church to achieve their political purposes. This becomes clear when one understands the historical and contextual background of Ethiopia’s political journey toward state formation and beyond.
As is well known, Ethiopia’s singular statehood is not dependent on pre-existing national commonality. Ethiopia became a state when previously disparate people groups with their own autonomous or semi-autonomous territories accepted ideals believed to transcend differences. The groups maintained their particularities but associated themselves with shared historical and cultural values and aspirations. They developed national consciousness and committed themselves to a shared national identity under a shared narrative of Ethiopianness.
But when the principle of self-determination spread across the world and independence movements sprang up among African colonies in the 1960s, some groups branded the Ethiopian imperial policies as those which were designed to achieve national identity at the expense of Eritrea’s autonomous status and ethnic, cultural and linguistic identities of other groups. Liberation movements sprang up from Eritrea to Ogaden. Decades of civil war, which culminated in the victory led by three liberation movements: Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and their allies, Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). This resulted in the demise of the military-communist regime in 1991, the disbanding of the Ethiopian army, the establishment of ethnic based administrations, and the independence of Eritrea as a state in 1993.
Then the idea that stronger national consciousness could only be achieved through affirming (rather than denying) diverse ethnic and linguistic identities became part of the political philosophy of the victorious OLF and TPLF-led coalition called the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Ethiopia became the only country in the world in which ethnic-based administrative system called ethnic federalism is constitutionally enshrined. This undermined the principle of unity in diversity. Common national values and uniting symbols are weakened. A healthy, inclusive and affirmative sense of identity proved increasingly difficult to achieve. This was further complicated by the instrumentalisation of EOTC.
Instrumentalisation of EOTC
From the introduction of Christianity in Ethiopia until 1974, the Ethiopian church and the state were two sides of the same coin. The state served as a political instrument to the church and the church as an ecclesiastical instrument to the state. This is partly because the monarch was one of the first converts in the 4th century Ethiopia and Christianity had become the state religion of the then politically and economically powerful Christian kingdom of Axum. After Christianity expanded southwards, the king continued to be the defender of Christianity. The king’s soldiers, accompanied by the priests, were those who evangelised the heathens and promoted pax Ethiopica. The monarchy and the Church became dependent on each other for their existence. Even the Marxist-Leninist regime, which brought the Ethiopian monarchy to an end in 1974 and murdered the Patriarch who was believed to be faithful to the monarchical system, maintained the existing annual budgetary support to EOTC.
But it was the TPLF-led EPRDF that ruthlessly instrumentalised religious institutions. On the one hand, it treated religion as a private matter and used religious institutions as its political tools on the other. The core leadership of TPLF-EPRDF was made up of a Marxist group and, therefore, covertly hostile to religion. But while ensuring that religion did not play any role in the public square, they thought it politically expedient to at once weaken EOTC and instrumentalise it. It achieved that through a number of ways.
First, it sought to undermine EOTC’s historical position as the single most important nation-wide symbol of unity. The Ethiopian flag (green, yellow and red), which is linked with EOTC, had become a uniting political symbol of Ethiopia. Given Ethiopia’s symbolic significance as a country that was never colonised meant that Ethiopian colours were adopted by not less than 13 African nations. And yet, the flag was associated with ‘oppressors’ represented by the northerners (particularly Amharas). This view was shared not only by the TPLF but also other political groups, particularly those amongst the Oromos. The flag was slightly modified and its modified form was constitutionally confirmed. EOTC officially remained faithful to the ‘old’ flag. So did several political parties. But there were EOTC members and political parties who came to accept the ‘new’ flag, hence division.
Second, quite incredibly the TPLF-EPRDF government forced the then EOTC Patriarch Abune Merqorios into exile to the USA, because he was believed to be unfriendly to the new regime. Abune Paulos, who was a Tigrean with a close relationship with the TPLF leadership, was brought back to Ethiopia from exile in the USA and instated as Patriarch. Such an action violated EOTC’s doctrine and tradition, where its spiritual head would only be replaced upon his death. The church was split over the legitimacy of Abune Paulos as Patriarch. Abune Merqorios presided over a synod-in-exile, although he had been officially excommunicated by the Synod in Ethiopia. Chaos reigned within the country and abroad as TPLF-EPRDF eagerly sought to use EOTC as its major ethno-political instrument.
Third, TPLF-EPRDF conveniently exploited the schism within the church through the claim of maintaining the security of the nation as a pretext. They tightly controlled the leadership. Their security personnel ensured that all the officials and clergy within the church toed the government line. Government ministers even attended Synod and other meetings. When Abune Paulos died in 2012, the proposal to bring back Abune Merqorios was rejected by the government. The current Patriarch Abune Mathias, who is from Tigray, was then elected. The division within the church continued, as many at home quietly submitted to the authority of the Patriarch-in-Exile.
When Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, he played a significant role in accelerating the on-going reconciliation process between the two factions and succeeded in uniting the church through the principle of compromise. His Holiness Abune Merqorios returned to Ethiopia as the Patriarch responsible for spiritual affairs, while Abune Mathias served as the Patriarch responsible for administrative affairs. Despite all this, the division continued. During the war in Tigray, the archbishop of Tigray declared the separation of the Tigray Orthodox Church from EOTC. The issue has become even more complicated.
The leaders of the current schism have now declared that they are establishing another synod for the ‘Orthodox Church of Oromo and Nation-Nationalities’, although what this means is not very clear. People of Tigrean and Oromo origins, who live in some states of the USA, for example, have already established their own ethnic based Orthodox churches. What all this shows is that in the current political climate in Ethiopia, the instrumentalisation of the church for political purposes has become possible because of the kind of ethnocentrism that pervades the country’s social and political spheres. Indeed, constitutionally enshrined political arrangements along ethnic lines, rather than ideological lines, have made the mingling of ethnic identity with religious identity possible, hence facilitating for political instrumentalisation of religion in Ethiopia.
Fusion of Ethnic and Religious Identities
By fusion of ethnic and religious identities, I mean an idea and practice where group identity, marked by common origins and language, defines, shapes and guides religious identity, narrative, expressions and practices. In other words, religious identity does not serve as a supra-identity creating a common space and uniting narrative for diverse racial, ethnic, national, geographical, linguistic and other identities.
In the Ethiopian context, the current development seeks to partly or fully reject the ideology that historically coalesced the invisible divine kingdom with the visible human kingdom in order to create common national identity under common Tewahedo doctrine, law, country, flag, and language. This ideology had been preserved and promoted mainly by the northerners (Amharas, Tigreans, Agaws etc) whose ethnic identities came to be intertwined with the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Christianity.
With the end of the monarchy and the exponential growth of Islam and Protestantism, this ideology could no longer take centre stage. And yet, many within the northerners still believe that political processes must centre on the fusion of ethnic identities with Orthodox Tewahedo Christianity. So, for them, a Tigrean or Amhara or Agaw ought to be an Orthodox. In recent years, many within the Oromos believe that political processes must centre on the fusion of ethnic identity with Islam or a traditional religion called Waaqeffannaa or Christianity (Orthodox or Protestant) or a combination of all of these under the leadership of tribal chiefs known as Abagadaas. All this is complicated by historical rivalries. In the current climate in Ethiopia, it is hardly possible to distinguish between ethnic rivalries and political or religious rivalries.
Before the change of political leadership in 2018, many Amharas and Oromos opposed to TPLF-EPRDF developed strong hostility towards ethnic Tigreans, who dominated both the political and pontifical spheres. As a result, the Tigreans in general, the majority of whom are Orthodox Tewahedo Christians, became the target of toxic rhetoric of both political and religious nature. As ethnicity was fused with religion and politics, even those who profess the same faith were not seen as sisters and brothers. Some radical Orthodox Tewahedo Christians in the north would even go so far as to view a non-Orthodox but Christian Prime Minister as an unbeliever, because for them the Orthodox Tewahedo Christianity is the foundation of patriotism, nationalism and personal identity.
Now, there are some among Oromo Christians who would regard any political or religious leader who does not affirm religious and political activities that centre on the Oromo identity as unacceptable or illegitimate. All this shows how ethnic-based rivalries and competitions that came to pervade the political sphere since the 1990s have now come to pervade the religious sphere. It also shows that an ideology developed on the basis of fusing ethnicity with religion or politics is intolerant and extremist with potentially dangerous and devastating consequences. What should be done?
Possible Ways of De-escalating the Current Crisis
I am a Protestant believer, so it would not be appropriate for me to venture opinions about the ways in which the leadership and believers of EOTC should behave. But I am concerned about the current crisis and schism within EOTC because I believe all Christians in Ethiopia share in our country’s earliest Christian heritage whose custodian is EOTC. I am also concerned about the peace and stability in our country, because religious violence within EOTC can be deadly and devastating for the whole country. So, I would like to make a few general suggestions for what they are worth.
1. Those on both sides of the argument must admit that mixing ethnic and linguistic identities with Christian identity exists on both sides and that it has served political purposes more than religious purposes and, consequently, led to suspicion, unhealthy competition, power struggle, division and hatred among Ethiopians.
2. It is important to bear in mind that for the last 2,000 years Christianity has taught a movement away from the old communal or tribal loyalties toward a universal identity based on Christ. This means that the localisation of narratives can dangerously undermine Christianity as a metanarrative, i.e. a narrative that transcends all other narratives. Hence, in my view, the principle that Christian identity transcends ethnic, linguistic, racial, national, political and geographical identities without dissolving them must guide the debate.
3. All parties within EOTC and the government must support the process of reconciliation reportedly initiated by academics and professionals from within EOTC. Both the leaders of the schism and the leadership of the Holy Synod of EOTC must be willing to engage in this.
4. The government must ensure that those politicians within the ruling and opposition parties, who seek to capitalise on the current crisis in order to promote their ethno-political agenda, cease from their activities. History tells us that employing religion as a political tool may bring about temporary political success but never achieves lasting peace and unity.
5. The EOTC leadership must play a key role not only in terms of de-escalating and resolving the current internal crisis of schism but also in terms of bringing people of diverse ecclesiastical and doctrinal backgrounds in Ethiopia around the apostolic table to discuss and dialogue. This will enable Ethiopians to create a Christian world in their country that is inhabited by people who recognise their ethnic, linguistic and doctrinal differences but think less about what divides them and more about what unites them with each other.
Desta Heliso studied at King’s College London and London School of Theology and served as lecturer and director of the Ethiopian Graduate School of Theology in Addis Ababa. He currently resides in London but continues to coordinate the Center for Ancient Christianity and Ethiopian Studies at EGST. He is also a fellow of the Center for Early African Christianity in New Haven and a visiting lecturer at the London School of Theology.
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Source: https://religionunplugged.com/