Dinknesh Ethiopia

Nile Conflict: Compensation Rather Than Mediation

How Europeans Can Lead an Alternative Way Forward
SWP Comment 2020/C 11, March 2020, 4 Pages
doi:10.18449/2020C11

The conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia over the distribution and use of the Nile water has entered a new phase. Questions about how and over what period of time the reservoir of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will be filled are taking centre stage. Against this backdrop, the USA launched a new mediation attempt at the end of 2019. However, initial hopes of a swift agreement have not materialized. The longer substantial results are postponed, the more apparent it becomes that ex­ternal mediation alone will not suffice to resolve the dispute. In order to defuse the conflict, it might be necessary for Egypt to compensate Ethiopia for concessions on the GERD. Germany and its European partners should provide Egypt with financial support for creating a compensation mechanism. This would promote stability in Europe’s conflict-ridden neighbouring region, and reduce migration pressure. But Europeans should tie financial contributions to clear conditions vis-à-vis Cairo, aimed at improving water management and overall governance.

The negotiations on the Nile water conflict, mediated by the US administration, had to be adjourned once more at the end of Feb­ruary. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan were again unable to agree on a joint and com­prehensive approach to the filling of the GERD reservoir. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has indicated that it could be months before an agreement is reached. Since three rounds of negotiations in Washington have already failed to produce any tangible results, a complete failure of the US initiative cannot be ruled out. In this situation, Article 10 of the trilateral Declaration of Principles of 2015 would be activated, which stipulates that further consultations should take place, that in­ternational mediation should be jointly initiated, or that negotiations should be conducted at the level of heads of state or government.

The lack of success of the Trump administration’s mediation efforts makes it clear once again that the conflict over the use of Nile water has reached a dead end. Whereas numerous negotiations in recent decades have focused on the fundamental question of water use rights, Egypt and Ethiopia are currently arguing above all about the time­frame in which the GERD reservoir is ex­pected to be filled from 2020 onwards. The Egyptian government is insisting on a slow fill of 12 to 21 years in order to avoid major bottlenecks in the water supply. The Ethio­pian government, on the other hand, wants to fill within 6 years in order to be able to reach full capacity for its power generation more quickly. Sudan is geographically located between the two parties and also in­volved in the negotiations, but takes a large­ly neutral position: together with Egypt, Khartoum is benefiting from the existing water distribution scheme and at the same time anticipates benefits from GERD. A fur­ther loss of time will in any case weaken the Egyptian negotiating position.

Egypt under Pressure
Egypt relies almost entirely on the Nile for its water needs, providing over 90 percent of the nation’s water resources. Approxi­mately 86 percent of the Nile water that reaches the Aswan Dam originates in the Ethiopian highlands. However, Ethiopia has so far been unable to take advantage of its favourable geostrategic position as an up­stream riparian state. In the past, a lack of financial resources and an unstable politi­cal situation prevented the expansion of the water infrastructure in Ethiopia.

In light of this, successive governments in Cairo have always insisted on the status quo of water distribution. In doing so, they relied primarily on colonial treaties: firstly, an agreement of 1929 with the colonial power Great Britain, which granted Egypt a veto right against water projects on the upper reaches; and secondly, an agreement with Sudan of 1959, which divided the Nile water resources between the two countries, and guaranteed Egypt 55.5 billion cubic metres annually and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic metres. Cairo ignores the fact that these contracts were negotiated without Ethiopia.

A Compensation Mechanism
A Compensation Mechanism

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Source: https://www.swp-berlin.org/

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