Dinknesh Ethiopia

Ethiopia: At risk of increased fragmentation despite a popular leader.

From fatal fights on university campuses to serious armed conflict, political violence in Ethiopia has shifted from resistance against the regime to ethnic strife, including riots and clashes instigated by ethnic militias. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s failure to adequately control the situation could jeopardize the Nobel Prize winner’s performance in the upcoming election, as many in Ethiopia have been pulled into societal fractures amid weak state control and the general deterioration of security nationwide.

Since coming to power in May 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), maintained a tight lid on competition between ethnically based federal states through harsh repression of media and political opposition movements. After his election in the spring of 2018, Prime Minister Abiy has opened political space significantly, allowing for a number of opposition groups to return to the country from abroad and participate in political activism (BBC, 29 June 2019).

The creation of political space and the return of armed resistance groups and activists with ethno-regional interests has exposed a weak central security apparatus in Ethiopia, demonstrated by the immediate rise and geographical spread of conflict between ethnic groups. While major clashes on the Oromia-Somali regional state borders cooled significantly during 2019, new conflicts have arisen across the country. During the second year of Abiy’s term, ACLED has recorded clashes between ethnic militias and communal groups near the Oromo-Afar regional state borders, the Guji Oromo-Gedeo community border areas, the Amhara-Gumuz regional state borders, the Oromo-Benishangul Gumuz regional state borders, and the Oromo special zones in Amhara region, among others – resulting in the displacement of millions (Africa News, 13 May 2019). ACLED records hundreds of fatalities resulting from ethnic conflict over the past year.

People living outside of their own ethnic zones, including a number of university students, have also faced increasing attacks. In October 2019, Oromia Media Network (OMN) owner Jawar Mohammed accused the government of attempting to assassinate him after his security guards were removed during the middle of the night. Protests by his supporters, mostly Oromo youth “Qerroo,” turned violent and resulted in at least 67 fatalities. Many of the dead were reported to have been ethnic minorities living in Oromia (AP, 26 October 2019). More recently, mosques and Muslim-owned businesses have been targeted for arson in East Gondar (Addis Standard, 21 December 2019), Amhara Christians have been attacked in the Bale-Robe area of Oromia, and several university students were killed by unidentified perpetrators or fellow students (Reuters, 10 December 2019).

Guerilla-style violence has also taken place within regional zones throughout the year, as those supporting the central government come into conflict with ethno-nationalist groups. Splinter factions of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) led by Jaal Marroo are accused of launching several attacks on regional officials and police forces in western Oromia (BBC Amharic, 2 December 2019). Similar violence has occurred in the Amhara region, including the successful assassination of Amhara regional leaders and the chief of staff of Ethiopia’s military.

ACLED records frequent protest events throughout the year, many in support or opposition to the Prime Minister’s reformist agendas. Others, often more violent, forwarded demands for enhanced cultural and political autonomy for ethnic groups in the country. These were especially amplified after the merging of the former ruling coalition, the EPRDF, into a single “Prosperity Party,” which dissolved five regional parties into a single block ahead of next year’s elections. While this was Abiy’s attempt at appealing toward a more unified national identity outside of his support base in Addis Ababa, opposition “federalists” largely supported by Ethiopia’s large rural populations feel that the merger forms the “structural foundation for a unitary state that will rob them off their [cultural] dignity and autonomy” (Al Jazeera, 5 December 2019).

Amidst the political uncertainty, and fearing a loss of cultural identity among a new centralization of power, at least two ethnic groups currently administered under Ethiopia’s Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s region are making bids for statehood. Weeks of protests rallies held in Hawassa culminated in a successful referendum that determined Sidama as Ethiopia’s 10th semi-autonomous regional state. (Addis Standard, 23 November 2019). Leaders of the Wolayta ethnic group are making a similar bid. Potentially more serious are a number of political movements that are vehemently opposed to Abiy’s ethno-nationalistic aims, including those advocating for complete succession (Ethiopian Insight, 28 September 2019).

What to watch for in 2020:

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has thus far maintained a delicate balance between advancing the interests of his own ethnic group, the Oromo, and pushing for a more united Ethiopia. His reformist agendas have been met with much applause from the international community. Yet, many in his own country view the changes with skepticism, as ethnic conflict has engulfed parts of Ethiopia. Large factions of the Oromo community that were key to ousting the old government accuse the Prime Minister of forgetting the many lives that were lost during the protest movements that ultimately put him in power (BBC, 23 October 2019).

2020 will be a pivotal year in Ethiopia. Central to political debate will be the future autonomy of Ethiopia’s ethno-regional states and the role of the capital, Addis Ababa, which has an ethnically diverse population despite its location in the heart of the Oromia region. Violence associated with border regions and competition over resources could worsen significantly if federal forces are unable to contain the situation. Federalist agendas and the push for greater autonomy in Ethiopia’s regional states are already shaping the country’s political landscape ahead of the 2020 election (Africa News, 2 January 2020), amplifying tensions between ethnic groups. Lastly, Egypt’s opposition to Ethiopia’s building of a hydropower dam on the Nile has threatened conflict for many years. While outright war is not likely, Egypt and other stakeholders could attempt to influence Ethiopia’s domestic politics by working with various ethnic groups in an attempt to sway future plans concerning the dam (BBC, 7 November 2019).

Ethiopia’s struggles with ethnic federalism are not over. Fractures in Ethiopian society are deep, with some differences dating back to the Amhara-controlled imperial regimes. If proper precautions are not taken, ethnic conflict and the fragility of the Ethiopian political system could lead to disaster in the 2020 election year.

 

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Source: acleddata.com

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